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BOOK REVIEWS
Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World: Change, Hylomorphism, and Material 
Objects, by Jeffrey E. Brower. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 
xxii + 327. $ 74.00 (hardback).
BRUNO NIEDERBACHER, SJ, University of Innsbruck
In this book, Jeffrey Brower investigates Aquinas’s view of the ultimate 
content and structure of the material world. He aims to reconstruct the 
essential elements of this view, to locate them in the wider context of 
Aquinas’s thought, and to engage this reconstruction in contemporary 
metaphysical debates. The book has five parts: Part I sketches Aquinas’s 
complete ontology; Part II analyses Aquinas’s theory of change in gen-
eral and of the two types of change, namely substantial and accidental 
change; Part III deals with hylomorphism, which is presented as a type of 
substratum theory (Thomistic substratum theory), and defends it against 
rival theories; Part IV spells out the precise connection between Aquinas’s 
hylomorphism and his account of material objects; Part V, entitled “Com-
plications,” deals with topics like transubstantiation, Aquinas’s view of 
the nature of human beings, and some problems with Aquinas’s account 
of the afterlife. Each discussion leads to refinements, extensions and modi-
fications of Aquinas’s theory. Thus the reader is led on an exciting path 
through an ontology of material objects that becomes increasingly differ-
entiated and sophisticated. In this review I cannot do justice to the rich-
ness and subtlety of Brower’s explorations. I can only touch roughly on a 
few main topics and formulate a few remarks.
Any presentation of Aquinas’s ontology must be a reconstruction, for 
Aquinas did not write a cohesive ontology or metaphysics. Brower’s re-
construction tries to be faithful to textual evidence, has in view the bigger 
picture of Aquinas’s thought more generally, and accepts the challenge of 
figuring out a coherent account of seemingly inconsistent passages. The 
reconstruction centers on hylomorphism, the view that material objects 
are compounds of matter and form. The question it addresses is: How 
does Aquinas understand the terms “matter,” “form,” and “compound”? 
Brower approaches hylomorphism from the perspective of Aquinas’s 
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theory of change, focusing mainly on the text De principiis naturae and the 
first book of the Sententia super Physicam. Change requires the existence 
of something that is changed. According to Brower, matter is that which 
endures in change, while form is that with respect to which the matter is 
changed. Thus, he initially proposes a functionalist understanding of the 
terms “matter,” “form,” “composition,” and “inherence.” The terms “po-
tency” and “actuality” are initially also seen as functional concepts that 
“provide us with an alternative way of describing the functional roles that 
Aquinas associates with matter and form” (67). One might think that such 
a functional reading indicates an antirealist understanding of the relevant 
items. But it does not. Brower defends a realist understanding of matter, 
form, and compound. For beings “of all three types are required . . . to ex-
plain the occurrence of any given change” (62). Since there are two types of 
change, accidental and substantial, one of the thorny questions that arises 
is: What exactly is the matter that endures in cases of substantial change? 
Brower says that the endurer is prime matter, and he ascribes to Aquinas 
four assumptions concerning it: prime matter is a type of being that (i) 
can be re-identified over time, (ii) can be compounded and divided, (iii) is 
infinitely divisible, and (iv) is atomless. According to Brower, prime mat-
ter is non-individual gunky stuff, that is, a kind of stuff the parts of which 
are all such as to have proper parts. This interpretation is, of course, highly 
contentious, and Brower tries to show that Aquinas’s characterization 
of prime matter as pure potentiality is compatible with it. According to 
Brower, Aquinas does not claim that prime matter lacks actuality in some 
way (namely via inherence), but only that it lacks actuality through itself 
(123). Another contentious doctrine that Brower associates with Aristotle 
and Aquinas is the doctrine of numerical sameness without identity. He 
introduces the doctrine first in the context of accidental change: distinct 
hylomorphic compounds such as the accidental unities white-Socrates and 
intellectually-educated-Socrates are distinct, but share a common parent sub-
stance. Or, a particular lump of bronze and a statue are the same material 
object but are distinct hylomorphic compounds. Later on, Brower engages 
the notion of numerical sameness without identity in order to show its po-
tential to solve the so-called problem of material constitution (as it arises 
in such puzzles known as the Debtor’s Paradox, the Ship of Theseus, the 
Body-Minus Argument, the Statue and the Lump) and in order to define 
material objects. Accordingly, “to be a material object is to be numerically 
the same as a hylomorphic compound possessing prime matter—that is a 
material substance or a material unity” (222). The last three chapters of 
the book deal mainly with Aquinas’s anthropology. According to Brower, 
human beings are a very special sort of compound: a compound of prime 
matter, on the one hand, and a sui generis type of particular, namely a 
human soul that is capable of existing without being enmattered, on the 
other. He calls this view “Thomistic dualism.” The two substances com-
prising this dualist partnership are (i) the compound, namely a particular 
human being, say, Socrates; and (ii) an immaterial substance, in this case 
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Socrates’s soul. Brower further develops the relationship between these 
two dualist components by considering a problem concerning the sort of 
existence a person has after death but before bodily resurrection. Some in-
terpreters, called “cessationists,” ascribe to Aquinas the view that Socrates 
ceases to exist when he dies and comes to existence again when his body 
is resurrected. Others, called “survivalists,” think that, according to Aqui-
nas, Socrates must survive his death. Brower shows the problems of both 
interpretations and makes a new suggestion: “insofar as Socrates retains 
his soul as a proper part, he can be said to survive his death as an indi-
vidual substance of a rational nature, and hence as a person. The impor-
tant point, however, is that insofar as Socrates’s soul ceases to be united 
with any matter, Socrates himself cannot be said to survive his death as a 
human being” (292). In this interim-state Socrates is a human person that 
is naturally disposed to be a human being. This disposition will be actual-
ized when Socrates’s soul is united with matter. Then he will be an actual 
human being again.
So far I have briefly presented some of the book’s main topics. Here are 
some critical remarks:
1. With respect to textual evidence, some texts that are used as evidence 
for some theses might not support them as clearly as Brower seems to 
intend. Two examples: First, Aquinas writes in De ente et essentia: “But 
the definition of natural substances contains not only form, but matter 
as well.” Brower comments: “As Aquinas insists here, and reiterates else-
where, the nature or essence of material substances must be said to in-
clude both matter (in the sense of prime matter) and form (in the sense of 
substantial form)” (201). However, in my view, Aquinas is speaking here 
not of prime matter. For according to Aquinas the definition of a human 
being would have to include flesh and bones—and if there were a defini-
tion of Socrates it would have to include these bones and this flesh. Sec-
ond, Brower uses a passage of the Commentary on the Metaphysics as direct 
evidence for the doctrine of numerical sameness without identity: “those 
things are one in number whose matter is one. . . . Indeed, it is on account 
of matter that a singular thing (singulare) is both one in number and di-
vided from other things” (In Meta. 5.8.876). Brower reads matter-sharing 
here as prime matter-sharing. However, the sentence which Brower leaves 
out of the quotation makes clear that Aquinas is not speaking about prime 
matter but about matter under determinate dimensions. He says: “For 
matter insofar as it is under determinate dimensions [dimensionibus signa-
tis] is the principle of individuation of the form.”
2. With respect to matter and form as metaphysical parts, Aquinas 
speaks sometimes of matter and form as metaphysical parts that constitute 
a compound. However, one can also find passages where he is reluctant 
in using such terminology. Aristotle thinks that such terms as “synthe-
sis” or “composite of matter and form” can be misleading, claiming that 
“the proximate matter and the form are one and the same thing, the one 
actually, and the other potentially.” Aquinas comments on this that “the 
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proximate matter, that is the one that is appropriated to the form, and the 
form itself are the same. For the one of the two is it as potency, the other 
as act” (In Meta. 8.5.1767). And in his Sententia libri De anima (2.1.234) he 
writes: “that matter is united to form is the same as matter is actualized.” 
These passages suggest that Aquinas does not in fact consider matter and 
form to be real metaphysical parts.
3. With respect to prime matter as stuff that can be re-identified, there 
certainly are contexts that suggest that Aquinas is committed to such a 
view, especially contexts elucidating his account of formal substantial 
change, and also his view of the resurrection of bodies that are numeri-
cally identical with bodies that lived once and decayed. Such an identity 
would seem to presuppose that there are portions of prime matter that can 
be re-identified. On the other hand, in De Principiis Naturae he writes that 
prime matter “dicitur una numero in omnibus . . . Dicitur etiam aliquid 
unum numero, quia est sine dispositionibus quae faciunt differre secun-
dum numerum”; i.e., that prime matter is numerically one in all means 
here that it “is without dispositions which make it differ in number.” In 
my view, this passage excludes the thesis that there are portions of prime 
matter that can be re-identified over time. Aquinas is not saying that there 
are “distinct portions of prime matter” which have a kind of “intrinsic 
unity” (114), but rather that prime matter as a whole has this unity.
4. Brower illustrates ordinary substantial change with the example of the 
generation of a human being. Such change involves several compounds: 
one compound that is generated (a human being, such as Socrates), and 
other compounds that are corrupted (the sperm and the ovum). (For pres-
ent purposes we may presuppose the correctness of this description.) The 
compounds sperm and ovum and the compound Socrates overlap with 
respect to their matter, which is, according to Brower, prime matter. But 
might Aquinas not be using “matter” in the sense of proximate matter, 
that is, formed matter that has the potential to take on a new substantial 
form? Surely, in this case there would be no endurer. But as Brower makes 
clear in his discussion of transubstantiation, substantial change does not 
necessarily involve an endurer that survives the actualization of a poten-
tiality. “In order for the relevant sort of potentiality to get actualized, it is 
sufficient for there to be a substratum that becomes something else” (240). 
This conception of substantial change would be free of the contentious 
assumption of the existence of prime matter as re-identifiable stuff.
These critical remarks are not intended to give a devaluing impression. 
Brower’s book is clearly and precisely written with well-articulated the-
ses and definitions. Many helpful figures illustrate the text. A glossary of 
technical terms at the end is very handy for keeping track of the various 
senses in which Aquinas uses these terms. Brower has delivered a philo-
sophical masterpiece of thoroughness and successful creative engagement 
with a classical author. It gives both Aquinas scholars and contemporary 
metaphysicians much “gunkless stuff” to think about for many hours.
